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Law and Armed Conflict:
Some of the Shared Policies
by Harry H. Almond, Jr.*

T HE

INTERNATIONAL LAW of armed conflict has tended

to simply mirror the practices developed by States when actually engaged in such conflict.' The objective of these laws, in
the past, has been protection of human values.2 To further this
objective, the laws regulate the freedom of the belligerents in the
use of their weapons and in the methods of attack which they
might employ. 3 Much of the policy which is shared by States is
codified in treaties such as the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and
1949, establishing protections for the victims of armed conflict
* Member of New York Bar and Barrister-at-Law of Gray's Inn, London,
England.
LL.M. and Ph.D. 1950, London School of Economics and Political
Science; J.D. 1948, Harvard Law School; M.Ch.E. 1946, Cornell Univ.; B.S.
1945, Yale Univ. Mr. Almond is presently Senior Attorney Advisor for International Affairs in the Department of Defense.
I The practice of the United States and of other States may be found in 10
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1968); 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTER(7th ed. 1952). See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW OF
LAND WARFARE (rev. 1976).
See also DEP'T OF THE NAVY, NWIP 10-2, LAW
OF NAVAL WARFARE (1955), which is in the process of revision.
2 Lauterpacht, Limits of the Operation of the Law of War, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
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and for prisoners of war, 4 and the Hague Conventions, particularly
the Hague Regulations, which were annexed to the Hague Convention (IV) of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land.5 Two protocols, presently under review at diplomatic
conferences in Geneva, are aimed at supplementing this "international humanitarian law."
Although these shared policies are reviewed against the background of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello, continuous clarification
and reexamination are required even when war is not threatened
because a process of coercion is continually taking place. This
process is affected by major new developments in weapons and
military technology which are moving mankind toward a far
greater destructive 6 and disabling force than ever known in the
past.7 Increased accuracy, 8 continuous improvements in launching
and delivery capabilities, and the development of sophisticated,
9
powerful weapons for use beneath the seas and in outer space,

I See THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT (1. Schindler and J. Toman eds.
1973); THE LAW OF WAR - A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (L. Friedman ed. 1972).
5 Infra note 24.
6 The destructive force of nuclear weapons can be seen in World War II.
According I%, R. WEIGLEY, THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR 359, 365 (1973), the
total casualties of prolonged bombing of Germany by the Allies were 305,000
killed and 780,000 injured. The casualties resulting from the "small" atomic
bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 115,000 killed, and an even larger
number wounded.
7 See McDougal and Feliciano, International Coercion and 1'orld Public Order:
The General Principle of the Law of War, 67 YALE L.J. 771 (1958); McDougal,
International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82 HAGUE RECUEIL
137 (1953); M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PURLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION (1961).
The importance of targets and targeting accuracy and therefore of discriminating weapons and methods of attack during World War I1 is brought
out by Albert Speer, who declared: "The American attacks, which followed a
definite system of assault on industrial targets, were by far the most dangerous.
It was in fact these attacks which caused the breakdown of the German armaments industry. The night attacks did not succeed in breaking the will to work
of the civilian population." Cited in R. WEIGLEY, supra note 6. In a war involving nuclear weapons, it also seems evident that the targets must be the adversary's nuclear weapons capabilities.
Sokolovsky observed with respect to Soviet military strategy: " . . . Soviet
military strategy takes into account the need for studying questions concerning
the use of outer space and aerospace vehicles to strengthen the defense of the
socialist countries. This must be done to insure the safety of our country, in
the interest of whole socialist commonwealth, and for the preservation of peace
in the world. It would be a mistake to allow the imperialist camp to achieve
superiority in this field. We must oppose the imperialists with more effective
weapons and methods for the use of space for defense purposes. Only in this
way can we force them to renounce the use of space for a destructive and
devastating war." V. SOKOLOVSKY, MILITARY STRATEGY 305 (1963).
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make a new appraisal of the institutions and procedures for controlling weapons technology an immediate necessity.
Policies among States with respect to. their conduct, interactions, claims, and communications affect the legal order which
they share.i ° International law - the law of a world legal order is a future-oriented policy. The flow of decisions which characterizes that law shows that it is an on-going process - that process being of greater real significance to the decision-maker than
is the hardened, black-letter rule. According to Professor McDougal,1 international law is:
• . .the comprehensive process of authoritative decision, transcending all territorial boundaries, by which the peoples of the
world clarify and implement their common interests.
To a certain degree, international law is self-enforced:
When we look at any community, that is, any group of people
exhibiting interdeterminations and interdependences, we can
observe a process of effective power in the sense that decisions
are taken and enforced whether particular people like it or not.
Such a process is observable on a global scale. Even the Russians, the Communist Chinese and ourselves are scorpions in
the same bottle who must take each other's decisions into ac-

count. 12
A number of major issues have arisen which call for a fresh
examination of the policies underlying the law of war. To understand the nature of these problems and issues, it is necessary to
recognize that the dialectics of State behavior compel us to view
13
armed conflict within the wider scope of general coercion.
The on-going process of coercion reveals a pervasive and distinct
character.
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12 The struggle between liberal Western democratic ideas and Soviet Marxism
is examined in Davenport, Civilization at Risk, 20 MODERN AGE 266 (Summer
1976).
13The framework of the public legal order is described by' M. McDOUGAL,
H. LASSWELL AND I. VLASIC, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE, 95-96 (1963)
as follows:
"In largest perspective, the process of authoritative decision today exhibited
by the most comprehensive earth-space community like the comparable processes
exhibited by its various lesser component communities, may be seen to com-
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Coercive behavior occurs whenever there are uses, attempted
uses, or preparations to use force capable of destabilizing the social order of the target State. This definition of coercion embraces, for example, the conduct of organized groups which seek
to compel others, notably governments, to meet their demands.
Owing to the nature and destructive force of today's modern weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, the process of coercion begins
with the preparation of those weapons or their agents because the
acquisition itself of such weapons is a threat.
This process extends not only to force which may amount to
war, de facto or de jure, but also to hostilities which fall short of war.
It extends to insurrections, "wars of national liberation," 14 and
outbreaks of civil violence, particularly where the size of the
groups involved is large or the weapons used are advanced. But
seeking the threshold of violence at which the interests of States
conflict is an ambiguous and largely fruitless task, particularly in
view of the fact that isolated outbreaks can easily escalate into,
or are sometimes already part of, a concerted plan to impose coercion.
The process of coercion envelopes many areas, of which actual violence is only one. It may be involved in the negotiations,
or the follow-up, or even the implementation of a "settlement"
of a conflict. The outcomes of the Korean and Southeast Asian
conflicts are two recent examples of coercion in these areas.
prise two different types of decision: those which establish or constitute the
major features of the general process of decision, and those which make particular applications of the authority so established to specific controversies
between participants about the distribution of values. The first, or 'constitutive,' type of decision embraces all the important decisions, made in response
to the basic claims to competence indicated above, which identify the decisionmakers authorized to act upon behalf of the community, project basic community goals for the guidance of particular decisions, establish all necessary
structures of authority, provide bases of power in authority and other values for
support of decision, stipulate and legitimize the use of different strategies in
persuasion and coercion in taking and enforcing decisions, and facilitate the
final outcomes in decision with respect to all the different functions. The
second type of decision, referred to as 'particular applications,' embraces the
whole flow of responses by authoritative decision-makers to that great bulk of
continuing, particular claims, described above as relating to access, minimum
order, responsibility for deprivations, jurisdiction over particular activities,
acquisition of resources, and so on. It is these latter decisions, past and probably
future, which are the principal focus of the subsequent chapters of this book,
and some general orientation in contemporary constitutive process would appear necessary to their rational consideration and appraisal."
14 A
Soviet scholar's assessment of wars of national liberation is in G.
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This more remote use of coercion shows that the strategic
instruments of States, those by which their foreign policies are conducted, operate to reinforce one another.15 Among States with
clearly defined foreign policies and with clearly established purposes in pursuing their foreign affairs, these strategies necessarily
act in concert with each other. 16 Under these circumstances, even
if coercion is not directly applied, a major State has ready access
to it. Other States are made aware of the coercive capabilities
of these powers. It is apparent, therefore, that a State may apply
coercion through economic, diplomatic or ideological means. Under
the umbrella of military power, a State can first use these other
strategies, firm up their use by acting in concert with other powerful States, and seek command and control over the transnational
decision process. Only if these other strategies fail will a major
power be compelled to give precedence to a military threat.
However, the growing advances in weapons and the resultant
threat induced by their mere acquisition suggest that the force of
economic and diplomatic strategies and ideological declarations
is always derived from an overhanging military threat. These
strategies are not different forms of coercion; they are simply
different masks for one coercive force: military power.

ISSUES

In view of the ever-widening reach of the process of coercion
and the ever-increasing military power upon which it is based, a
number of policy considerations need to be reexamined. Among
them are the following:
15"Wars of national liberation" are an instrument of Soviet foreign policy
directed at the West, and justified within if not sanctioned by "peaceful coexistence."
Referring to the wars in Vietnam and Algeria as examples,
Khrushchev declared on Jan. 6, 1961, "This is a liberation war, a war of independence waged by the people. It is a sacred war. We recognize such
wars; we have helped and shall continue to help peoples fighting for their
freedom . . . These uprisings cannot be identified with wars between countries, with local wars, because the insurgent people fight for the right of selfdetermination, for their social and independent national development; these uprisings are directed against corrupt reactionary regimes, against the colonialists.
The communists support just wars of this kind whole-heartedly and without
reservations, and march in the van of the peoples fighting for liberation."
Cited in

H.
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1960-1970,

82-83 (1971).
16 Cf. M. McDOUGAL,

H. LASSWELL AND I. VLASIC, supra note 13, at 360, on

"Claims. Relating to the Maintenance of Minimum Order."
of strategies and objectives is pursued in chapter 4.
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1. The principle of military necessity;
2. The prevention, deterrence or reduction of impermissible coercion, and;
3. The commitments toward the maintenance of international peace and security made under the United Nations
Charter.
A brief comment with respect to the background against which
these issues exist is in order. In all activities and interactions
among States, the major cause of tension is the claim that each
State may determine for itself as a "sovereign State" those actions it will take to satisfy its exclusive or "national" interests.
But, in the gradually emerging recognition that no State can secure its vital or fundamental interests by itself (particularly in
view of the differences in development of military technology),
there is an increasing desire for inclusive, world-community oriented action for international pcace and security. Detailed analysis tends to reveal more subtle tensions: The Soviet Union and
Communist States in general consider that the "human rights"
provisions of the United Nations Charter 17 are subordinate to the
They also tend to believe
over-riding importance of "security."
that the dialectics of world history will lead to a -soecialist coinWhen this happens, "security" will be
monwealth of States."
achieved, and only then can "human rights" be sought. 18
But even without this closer analysis, one Can see that the
framework of interaction among States is imposed by the realities
of a real world in which a military confrontation between the major States will unleash a destructive force the outcome of which is
beyond the capabilities of their officials and their institutions to
control. The search for a "controlled" outcome of nuclear warfare continues, but time favors the technological advance of
weapons over the ability to control their spread and use. 19 Technology in weapons has tended, in the last four decades, to outstrip
the means by which their effective assimilation into armed con'7The

views of the Soviet Union as to peaceful coexistence are examined in

R. ALLEN, PEACE OR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE (1966).
15 Lauterpacht, Universal Declaration of Human

Rights, 25

BRIT.

Y.B.

INT'L

L. 354 (1944).
19 Past trends with respect to the management of major armed conflicts
First, the process of managing an armed conflict is in acshow two things.
tuality "shared" by the belligerents in the sense that both are concerned with
Technological developments providing
avoiding total loss through "total war."
for destruction beyond the experience of past combats and conflict indicate that
a future armed conflict will overreach these capabilities and that the outcome can
be expected to move toward total destruction.
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flict can be controlled. As a result, the risk level to the social
order has grown more rapidly than have the institutions and procedures which are supposed to make the outcomes of a major
armed conflict manageable.
Increased mobility of persons across transnational boundaries
means that individual conduct could involve a single State or even
a number of States. If one lone terrorist 20 were to get control
of nuclear explosive devices, 'he would be beyond the control of
any State if he were willing to use them.
The development of modern weaponry is, therefore, a major
factor that has created a need among States to reestablish a
shared policy concerning the control of weapons and their components, their use, and threats of their use. The proliferation
of nuclear weapons has created the possibility of world-wide destruction in the event of a conflict among major States. Therefore, there must be a continuous process of inquiry, similar to
that of the physical scientists, to provide the institutional bases
and procedures which can operate effectively to prevent and deter
the use of these weapons.
Because the process of coercion has such a broad reach, it is
apparent that its control involves a multivariant set of policies.
Variants include policies with respect to technological developments and the objectives, motivations, and "needs" of the
States. 21 Certain policies, however, expressed in the simplified
forms followed in the brief discussion below dominate the current
legal framework.
THE PRINCIPLE OF MILITARY NECESSITY AND
22
THE PRINCIPLE OF HUMANITY

The "law of war" embodies two fundamental, usually opposed,
policy goals. One is exemplified in the claim of the belligerents
20 On

terrorism, see bibliography in

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL

(M. Bassiouni ed. 1975). See also INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND WORLD
SECURITY (D. Carlton and C. Schaerf eds. 1975).
For a general legal treatment, with emphasis on the law of war, see J. BOND, THE RULES OF RIOT (1974).
2i For a detailed review, see Frank, Nuclear Terrorism and the Escalation of
International Conflict, 29 NAVAL WAR COL. REV. 12 (1976).
With respect to the
present means of deterring and preventing terrorism, Frank declares: "My own
view is that nuclear terrorism is probably inevitable. We have already witnessed several terrorist or terrorist related incidents involving nuclear materials."
Id. at 15.
22 Citations on military necessity may be found in 2 WORLD POLITY (1958)
which has an extensive bibliography; see also O'Brien, The Meaning of "Military
Necessity" in International Law, 1 WORLD POLITY 166 (1957), and his citations,
CRIMES
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to their legal right to engage in armed conflict until their adversary's will or capability to resist is overcome. This claim is promoted by an appeal to military necessity, which creates the freedom, subject to the restraints of international law, to pursue a
conflict by attacking and, if necessary, destroying legitimate military targets and objectives with discriminating weapons. The
other policy goal, imposed by the world community, is that belligerents respect the humanitarian elements underlying the world
order.
The humanitarian element is actually inherent in the practical
application of the principle of military necessity. It is manifested
in the restraints imposed by international law. Law of war restraints on weapons use and manner of attack operate to effect
humanitarian outcomes. One restraint is the demand that States
use those discriminating weapons at their disposal. This requires
the States to single out as targets only legitimate military objectives and, therefore, to avoid attacking the civilian population.
A further restraint is the requirement that the use of weapons, the
mounting of attack, and the methods of armed conflict meet the
This legal standard requires
legal standard of reasonableness.
that the force used shall be proportionate to the military objective
to be attained. The humanitarian principle is conveyed by the
prohibition against weapons or attacks that might cause unnecessary suffering, and by the rules that have been derived from the
practice of States. The principle is extended to some weapons
by agreements denying belligerents the legal right to use those
weapons in armed conflict. Other derivative law denies the belligerent the right to engage in excessive force against his adversary,
regardless of the level of the conflict. This policy extends beyond armed conflict per se, to all forms of coercion. It has led to
the declaration of customary law in the law of war treaties, such
as the Geneva Protocol of 192523 (banning the use of lethal chemicals) and the Hague Regulations of 1907. 24 This policy is the
Downey, The Law of War and Military Necessity, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 251 (1953).
These articles give a detailed analysis of "necessity" and policy views which
differ from mine. O'Brien, for example, favors natural law as the basis for
military necessity. Note that this premise conflicts with that of Marx and
Hegel who argue that territorial integrity and sovereignty of the State transcend
the rights of citizens.
23Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17,
1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061.
2AHague Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539.
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basis for seeking the supplementary law in the Protocols presently
under consideration in the diplomatic conferences in Geneva.
The jurists and the courts have elaborated the principle, drawing on the practice of States to give it legal content. The Nuremberg Tribunals described the principle of military necessity as

follows:
Military necessity has been invoked by the defendants as justifying the killing of innocent members of the population and the
destruction of villages and towns in the occupied territory.
Military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of
war, to apply any amount and kind of force to compel the complete submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life and money. In general, it sanctions measures
by an occupant necessary to protect the safety of his forces and
It permits the deto facilitate the success of his operations.
struction of armed enemies and other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable by the armed conflicts of the
war; it allows the capturing of armed enemies and others of
peculiar danger, but it does not permit the killing of innocent
inhabitants for purposes of revenge or the satisfaction of a lust
to kill. The destruction of property to be lawful must be imper-atively demanded by the necessities of war. Destruction as an
end in itself is a violation of international law. There must be
some reasonable connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy forces. It is lawful to
destroy railways, lines of communication, or any other property
Private homes and
that might be utilized by the enemy.
churches even may be destroyed if necessary for military operations. It does not admit the wanton devastation of a district
or the willful infliction of suffering upon its inhabitants for the
sake of suffering alone2 5
This opinion is reinforced by a separate opinion of the Nuremberg Tribunal emphasizing that the principle of military necessity
is subject to international law. The principle of military necessity, in other words, cannot be considered as a defense for violating
rules of international law. Instead, it is my view that it operates
within, and as part of, international law, as moderated by the
principle of humanity:
It is the essence of war that one or the other side must lose and
the experienced generals and statesmen knew this when they
drafted the rules and customs of land warfare. In short these
rules and customs of warfare are designed specifically for all
phases of war. They comprise the law for such emergency. To
claim that they can be wantonly - and at the sole discretion of
15

The Hostages Case, 11

TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS

1253-54 (1950).

[Vol. 9:175

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

any one belligerent - disregarded when he considers his own
situation to be critical, means nothing more or less than to abrogate the laws and customs of war entirely.26
As Professor Castren 27 has pointed out, the principle of military necessity was originally established as a relatively general

principle from which we could derive, out of the practice of States,
an elaboration of certain usages into accepted rules.

Some of the

older German writers, particularly at the time of the First World
War, took the view that it was permissible to ignore the laws of
war derived from this principle when a situation of extreme distress arose. As to this, Professor Castren points out:
This view is expressed by the slogan 'Kriegrison geht vor Kriegsmanier,' that is to say military expediency overrides the usages
of war. This catch phrase is dangerous and misleading in so
far as it refers in a general way to the usages of war without
mentioning the laws of war, and it may thus give the impression
that even the laws of war are no more than usages without sanctions. In point of fact the expression 'Kriegsmanier' also comprises the laws of war, both written and customary, but even
this does not really improve the matter . . . This view of the
elasticity of the laws of war must be absolutely rejected as it
cannot be legally justified and as its practical consequences are
most dangerous.
It would enable combatants to justify any
deviation from the laws of war on the real or supposed ground
of military necessity and would soon lead to complete anarchy.
The evaluation of military necessity may often be extremely
precarious owing to the uncertainty and elasticity of this concept . . .
It should further be noticed that from a legal standpoint
comparatively few rules, designed to cover situations of military
necessity, are exceptional rules from which it is not possible to
draw general conclusions and hardly even decisions by way of
analogy. The laws of war are the result of a compromise between military and humanitarian interests, and the necessities of
war have already been sufficiently observed in the framing of
these rules.28
The principle of military necessity is not a legal precept,
useful only to jurists or legal advisors in preparing their advice to
governments.
It speaks to the commander in the field and to the
officials in government who direct the course of hostilities, and
who are the ultimate policy and decision-makers.
These officials
26

The Krupp Trial, 10
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27
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28 Id.
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are also those who, under law, are responsible for engaging in
and prosecuting armed conflict. To a certain extent the restraints
on military necessity flow from the "psychological set" established
in these policy-makers, whose intentions and deliberations may
be called into question. Opportunities and options available to
them to avoid situations that might lead to unnecessary suffering
can be raised to call leaders to task. In a world much aware
of and sensitive to public opinion, demands for investigations into
policy and for participation in. decisions with respect to conflict
can operate as strong incentives for compliance with international
norms.
Such demands call for adherence to the "rule of law"
and to the firm practice of fairness and justice.
The moderating principle of humanity introduces a separate
yet intimately related element of policy in the operation of the
principle of military necessity. Perhaps it is correct to say that
its operation is necessary in the application of the principle of
military necessity, because the operation of one without the other
makes principles intended to regulate violence meaningless. The
Department of the Navy, in its Law of Naval Warfare (NWIP
10-2), declares:
The principle of humanity prohibits the employment of any kind
or degree of force not necessary for the purpose of the war,
i.e. for the partial or complete submission of the enemy with the
least possible expenditure of time, life, and physicai resources. 29
The principle of humanity as described, becomes a kind of mirror
image of the principle of military necessity. In its comments,
the Department of the Navy adds the following:
In allowing only that use of force necessary for the purpose of
war, the principle of necessity implies the principle of humanity
which disallows any kind or degree of force not essential for the
realization of this purpose; that is, force which needlessly or unnecessarily causes or aggravates both human suffering and
physical destruction. Thus, the two principles may properly be
described, not as opposing, but as complementing each other.
The real difficulty arises, not from the actual meaning of the
principles, but from their application to practice. 3
Paragraph 41 the Department of the Army's The Law of Land
Warfare (FM 27-10), declares:
41. Unnecessary Killing and Devastation.
...
. loss of life and damage to property must not be out of
proportion to the military advantage to be gained. Once a fort
29 DEP'T OF NAVY, supra note 1.
3o

Id.
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or defended locality has surrendered, only such further damage
is permitted as is demanded by the exigencies of war, such as
the removal of fortifications, demolition of military buildings,
31
and destruction of stores.
The principle of military necessity is implemented in the practice of States in the conduct of war. In no other field of international law is practice so important; the stakes involved are
humanitarian standards. But attempts to apply the principle beyond the actual practice of States in armed conflict would be
tantamount to raising illusions. Resort to barbarous practices in
a major conflict between the major States would amount to a
retreat from the humanitarian standards so far attained. But
the realities of such circumstances would compel us to apply lower
standards to the practical application of the principle and rules of
the law of war. The treaties, codifications of rules in international agreements, and international agreements in general which
seek to impose greater reasonableness and higher standards of
humanity all depend in their application and their outcomes upon
practice. This is what "respect" for the law of war is all about.
In the growth and development of the international law of
armed conflicts, there are analogies to the common law process.
The "law" must clearly be found in the practice of States - a
practice that reveals the expectations of those who participate in
its application and restraints. The four Geneva Conventions of
1949, in their common Article I, at best anticipate the hopes of the
draftsmen in declaring that "The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention
in all circumstances. "32
Professor McDougal, in referring to customary international
law, declares:
What is important in the development of international law by
custom is, we may emphasize, the crystallization of perspectives
among peoples, and especially among their effective decisionmakers, that certain past uniformities in decision will, and
33
should be observed in the future.
With respect to the great powers, such as the United States
and Soviet Union, the process by which the customary law develops appears in "mutual tolerance" and "mutual restraint,"
and the process itself comes alive in the practice between them:
31 DEP'T OF ARMY, supra note

1.

32Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art.
1, Aug. 12, 1949, [1956] 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364.
33 M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLASIC, supra note 13, at 243.
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Obviously, the main reason for this mutual tolerance lies in the
expectations that attempts to obstruct by one side might automatically result in countermeasures by the other side, with
probable losses to both. The fact that the two polar blocs possess weapons of mass annihilation and are equally vulnerable
against each other no doubt in a very large measure account for
their willingness to seek compromise through tacit mutual restraint. Our emphasis upon the reciprocities and tolerances
exhibited in confrontations between the great powers should not,
however, detract from comparable attitudes occurring almost
daily in interactions involving minor powers. 34
If the United States claims to advance human dignity in the world
order, and if the process creating customary law is accepted as
described, there is then a duty on such States as the United States
to assume a leading role in such development in its practice,
shaping the attitudes of other States to the same ends.
The clauses on denunciation in the four Conventions each
rightly contain the language which declares that their substance,
in the customary international law, continues to apply even if the
Conventions are denounced:
The denunciation shall have effect only in respect of the denouncing Power. It shall in no way impair the obligations
which the Parties to the conflict shall remain bound to fulfill
by virtue of the principles of the law of nations, as they result
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the
laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience. 35
Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
which is not yet in force, codifies the customary international
law that humanitarian obligations do not terminate:
5. Paragraphs 1 to 3 (which provide for termination of treaties)
do not apply to provisions relating to the protection of the
human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in particular in provisions prohibiting any form of reprisals
against persons protected by such treaties.36
If the shared policies of States with respect to their law
governing armed conflict were to be implemented solely in their
practice during armed conflict, the growth of that law would be
incredibly slow. Past trends in all armed conflicts clearly reveal
this fact and need not be examined here. 37 To ensure protection
N Id. at 45.
35Supra note 32, art. 142.
36Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 24 U.N.G.A.,
Doc. A/CONF. 39/27.
37"What is important in the development of international law by custom is,
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of humanitarian values, particularly in view of the new weaponry,
more is required than statements such as the formal acceptance
by States of obligations or commitments in their treaties, 38 the
remarks their delegates make for the "negotiating record," and
the debates and positions taken with respect to United Nations
General Assembly resolutions, among others.
Ratification of a
treaty or adherence to a treaty and its "obligations" are at best
legalistic formalities that are meaningless without implementation.
Therefore, the policy of States must be to provide for effective
39
implementation during periods when conflict is not underway.
Wider implementation of the law of war treaties has been
contemplated and even required in such treaties as the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, but the effectiveness of the implementation
makes great demands upon States to "open up" their social orders
to permit wider participation within their bureaucracies by the
general public. It requires dissemination and explanation of the
treaty texts, which unfortunately are instruments of such complexity as to defy any but the specializing lawyers to understand
them. It requires a sound program of instruction to be associated
with the application of the treaty provisions. It calls for a clear
understanding on all levels of policy and decision-making of the
general structure of the law of war and its policy. Instruction
and dissemination must extend to the public at large, as well as to
the command levels of the armed forces and to armed forces personnel.
The humanitarian thrust of the principle of military necessity
depends for support in part upon the behavior of commanders in
conducting hostilities. The related principle of economy of force,
we may emphasize, the crystallization of perspectives among peoples, and especially among their effective decision-makers, that certain past uniformities in
decision will, and should, be observed in the future."
M. McDoUGAL, H.
LASSWELL & I. VLASIC, supra note 13, at 243.
31 Professor Tunkin described the reception and adherence of the USSR
to customary international law to be that which it chose to accept. He is cited
in M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL, & I. VLASiC, supra note 13, at 130-131, as
follows: "It is true that the Soviet Union did not accept all the norms which at
the time of her emergence were considered as norms of general international law.
But the Soviet Union refused to recognize only reactionary norms . . . It is
not therefore inaccurate to assert that with the appearance of the Soviet State
some norms of the then international law, rejected by the Soviet State, ceased
to be norms of general international law, but it is of importance to add that this
limitation took place at the expense of reactionary norms of international law.
As to democratic norms of general international law, the Soviet Union never
rejected them."
31 Cf Przetacznik,
The Socialist Concept of Protection of Human Riqllts, 38
SOCIAL RESEARCH 337 (1971).
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shared by the States, offers more support.40
described by Professor Weigley as follows:

This principle

is

It refers less to the modern sense of 'economy' implying minimum expenditure of resources than to the judicious employment and distribution of force . . . it has been taken to mean
that the most discerning use of combat power will permit the
41
commander to accomplish his mission with minimum cost.
According to Professor Osgood:
It prescribes that in the use of armed forces as an instrument
of national policy no greater force should be employed than is
necessary to achieve the objectives toward which it is directed;
or, stated in another way, the dimensions of military force
42
should be proportionate to the value of the objectives at stake.
Professor McDougal comments on this policy:
The only assumption necessary to the usefulness of a formulation in terms of economy of force is the assumption that men
may, by modification of their conscious attitudes, in some measure anticipate through time the probable effects of alternative
courses of action and thus either maximize their gains or mini43
mize their losses.

40 An "economy in force" principle can be traced to SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR
39 (S. Griffith trans. 1971): "Only when the enemy could not be overcome by
these (i.e., other) means was there recourse to armed force, which was to be
applied so that victory was gained: (a) in the shortest possible time; (b) at the
least possible cost in lives and effort; (c) with infliction on the enemy of the
fewest possible casualties."
41 R. WEIGLEY, supra note 6, at 214.
42 Professor Osgood's remarks are cited by M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO,
supra note 7, at 35.
43 M. McDoUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 7, at 35-36. They further observe: "Past applications of coercion may be described in terms of the actors'
objectives and calculations of proportionality, and comparison may be made of
effects achieved. . . . Formulations in terms of economy in force, specifically
related to community perspectives both of purpose and proportionality, may,
further, be projected into the future as appropriate criteria for authoritative
decision. Whatever successes the law of war has in the past achieved, and
there have been some, are testimony to the efficacy of this effort . . . it is
sometimes suggested that men shape the proportion of their violence not so
much from perspectives of economy, or of humanitarianism, as from fear of
reprisals. The short answer is that minimizing risks of reprisal is precisely
an aspect of economy in force. An application of force that results in the
applier's sustaining retaliatory destruction can scarcely be described as economic. In terms of effects upon the humanitarian goals we recommend, moreover, it does not matter too much whether decision to limit destruction is based
upon calculation of long-term self-interest, whether for preserving potential
assets of minimizing risks of retaliation, or upon humanitarianism for fellow
man." Supra note 7, at 36.
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The principle of military necessity, therefore, is supported by
the "realities" of the conduct of armed conflict. It gains content
through the "realities" of governments, their officials and others
who participate in the decisions and policies toward conflict, and
through the manner in which hostilities are carried out. The
principle reflects the standards of reasonableness, which in "open
societies" can serve to give it greater effectiveness.
THE POLICY OF DETERRENCE

A second set of policies associated with the process of coercion
is to be found in deterrence. 44 These policies extend to matters
of arms control and disarmament, management of the outbreak
of terrorism, and initiation and escalation of conflicts. A more
detailed analysis would reveal their relationships to other sanctioning goals such as the prevention of violence and the corrective
measures to be used against those who attempt or engage in impermissible violence.
Shared policies establishing the basis for deterrence are set
forth in the "master agreement" between the United States and
the Union of Socialist Republics, calling for a balance of equal
security as a fundamental goal of their negotiations.45 Equal
security is established, however, not only by balancing the weapons
with which we confront one another, but by holding one another's
46
populations as hostage as the ultimate stakes of a nuclear war.
Since the inception of deterrence with strategic nuclear weapons,
there has emerged a realistic recognition throughout the world
that this process can be stabilized by further efforts toward general and complete disarmament, or can be destabilized by asym44 A. GEORGE & R. SMOKE, DETERRENCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THEORY
AND PRACTICE (1974). See also, J. COLLINS, GRAND STRATEGY (1973).

45Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, June 21, 1973, 24 'U.S.T. 1472,
T.I.A.S. No. 7653. The Agreement reads, in part, ". . . in particular both
Sides will be guided by the recognition of each other's equal security interests
and by the recognition that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage, directly or indirectly, would be inconsistent with the strengthening of peaceful relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."
46 The balancing of equal security has certain inherent limitations because it
only operates between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. What happens to such a balancing process in the event that a third
State, China, for example, becomes a major nuclear power with strategic weapons? How does the balance operate if even smaller nuclear powers proliferate,
particularly in view of the need to avoid the outbreak of any nuclear war and
the possibility of escalation?
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metries inherent in the factors that must be used to establish the
balance itself.
The present practice of the major Powers reveals their tacit
understanding that nuclear conflicts between them cannot take
place47 (unless, of course, one side can shift the balance substantially in its favor) because the outcomes would be overwhelmingly catastrophic to the social orders, to human life, to
property and to the future of society. 48 The shared policies
concerning the desirability of limiting nuclear conflicts present
Limited conflicts cannot escalate into nuclear
ambiguities.49
conflicts, even into "limited" nuclear conflicts, unless the belligerents have access to and are willing to assume the risks of the
use of nuclear weapons, or unless their reliance upon conventional
It is, therefore, difficult to determine
weapons begins to fail.
whether a limited nuclear conflict in which a major power is
engaged, or in which it supports or assists another State, will
extend beyond its control into an unlimited nuclear conflict.50
To the extent that the shared policy and expectations with respect
to the use of nuclear weapons are shifted when the balance between States is destabilized, nuclear weapons will no longer serve
to deter coercion. Deterrence is also weakened as policymakers
become convinced that nuclear weapons are simply conventional
weapons whose destructive force has been quantified.
47 Wohistetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror, 37 FoR. AiF. 211 (1959).
48 Cf. R. WEIGLEY, supra note 6, at 477: "The very hardening of the missile

sites of both rivals, which enhanced the deterrent effect of both retaliatory forces
and the stability of nuclear balance during the 1960's, would make controlled
and discriminating general war unlikely in the 1970's if deterrence should fail,
because destroying the enemy's strategic force would require so overwhelming
a weight of nuclear weapons that it would be bound to destroy much or most of
his society in the process. It remains difficult also to imagine tactical nuclear
war that would not be either a very brief eruption giving way quickly to a different kind of bargaining if the world were very lucky, or the prelude to general
war. Because the record of nonnuclear limited war in obtaining acceptable decisions at tolerable cost is also scarcely heartening, the history of usable combat may at last be reaching its end."
49Deterrence and military strategy are in the view of some commentators
clearly not limited to the use of military measures alone. Schelling declares:
"Military strategy can no longer be thought of, as it could be for some countries in some areas, as the science of military victory. It is now equally, if
not more, the art of coercion, of-intimidation and deterrence." T. SCHELLING,
ARMS AND INFLUENCE 34 (1966).
50 The extent to which

the equal balance between the United States and
USSR can continue to provide an effective base for world "security" depends
upon such circumstances as the policies of China - not a party to the strategic
arms limitation agreements such as the ABM Agreement.
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The process of deterrence operates not only against those engaged in armed conflict but also against those who might initiate
such conflict.
Also, it operates to supplement or support the
legal restraints imposed upon States by establishing a "countervailing" force which an adversary may not wish to see unleashed.
The legal right of reprisal, for example, applies to deter unlawful
uses of weapons or attacks. But the exercise of that right requires the use of weapons or methods of attack otherwise illegal
and therefore presupposes that the capabilities to carry out reprisal are available. It operates in law at least to deter continuation or repetition of the unlawful conduct. Lethal gases, for
example, regarded as unlawful and restrained by the Geneva
Protocol of 1925,51 if used by an adversary would entitle the other'
side to retaliate in kind, or, according to some views, to retaliate
with other unlawful measures in order to compel compliance with
the law of war.
Because the legal right of reprisal depends upon the capabilities to retaliate in kind with unlawful weapons, its operation
tends to limit the reach of arms control agreements. Provisions
calling for "nonuse"52 of weapons or methods of attack, taken
literally as absolute restraints, are unrealistic, or subject to subterfuge, or will become illusory in practice. Even worse, the
agreements are subject to termination under international law and
by their own terms, and this reality compels us to anticipate that
most States will seek to be prepared for reprisal. Resolutions
in the United Nations lack legal force but the resolution process
appears to provide the means by which States can claim that
they are "peace-loving."
It is apparent that the policy and process of deterrence calls
s3
for weapon capabilities even where the weapons are banned
Supra note 23.
52The United States position on a proposal by the USSR for a draft treaty
that would be directed to the non-use of force declared that such a proposal
merely confuses the wider perspectives of the United Nations Charter, and
tends to reduce their value, particularly those relating to human rights and to
the peaceful settlement of disputes. See statement by Rosenstock, U.S. Representative, Sixth Committee, Press Release USUN-156 (76), Nov. 22, 1976.
53 Deterrence, according to Brodie, "uses a kind of threat which we feel
must be absolutely effective, allowing for no breakdowns ever. The sanctions,
to say the least, are not designed for repeating action. One use of it will be fatally
too many. Deterrence now means something as a strategic policy only when we
are fairly confident that the retaliatory instrument upon which it relies will not
be called upon to function at all."
B. BRODIE, STRATEGY IN THE MISSILE AGE
272-273 (1965).
51
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An agreement not to use weapons, made in peacetime between
States reasonably willing at that time to compromise and enter
into "binding" undertakings, dictates that those States will conform to the agreement or to the underlying law of war in armed
conflict.
Because such agreements necessarily extend to "contracting States," by logic they do not apply to non-contracting
States. As such, States may be anticipated to narrowly construe
such agreements, and consider themselves free to prepare for conflicts against the non-Parties as they see fit. The treaties could
be worded to avoid this outcome, but up to the present, even their
language has not attempted to limit this freedom as to non-contracting States.
The policies and process of deterrence must be applied once
an armed conflict has been concluded as well as during times when
a conflict seems imminent or possible. Conflicts terminating in
"unconditional surrender" permit the total disarmament, and the
But, as the
reconstruction and rehabilitation of an adversary.
events in Korea and Southeast Asia have indicated, a State must
be prepared to enforce the "peace" or armistice and establish
a policy to deter misconduct. Failing to do so will mean that a
State cannot achieve a "peace with honor," but at best will attain
illusion and cynicism, encouraging future misconduct.
As already indicated, the dynamics of deterrence apply to
peacetime policies addressing coercion, and, in particular, to the
policies of arms control. The arms control policy of the United
States is described by its fundamental legislation as "an important
aspect of foreign policy," which "must be consistent with national
security policy as a whole." 54 The "formulation and implementation of United States arms control and disarmament policy" must
be "in a manner which promotes the national security." s
That
policy is to be implemented in international agreements "including the necessary steps taken under such an agreement to establish
an effective system of international control."s6 National security
is to be protected under United States practice by verification
sufficient to ensure compliance by all Parties.
But, almost by definition, arms control policy in its implementation through international agreement (aside from some very exceptional cases) must be a shared policy with other States. The
54 Sections 2 and 3 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, 75 Stat. 631,
22 U.S.C. § 2551 (1974).
55Id.
56 Id.
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deterrence maintained must be a realistic deterrence, because a
breakdown in this process, or in the balance of equal security, is a
breakdown of mutual security. Dangerous tensions inevitably result. A piecemeal approach creates obvious risks because arms
control, as part of a policy of substantial and effective deterrence,
must maintain symmetry. Current developments in the arms control agreements so far reached clearly do not create complete symmetry.5 7 On the other hand, the arms control process as a "way
of life" between potential adversaries is as important - perhaps
more important - than the agreements reached.
The process of deterrence as it applies to arms control, applies
primarily to the use of weapons.5 8 But, because weapons are designed to be used in armed conflict, arms control policy, and the
agreements by which it is implemented, will not deny a Party the
use of the "controlled" weapons wherever there are reasonable
expectations that the weapons will be used or will be required
for effective prosecution of a conflict. The speculative nature of
this problem is such that the weapons chosen so far, as "controlled" weapons, are those not in preferred use today. Moreover, arms control policy and the public interest in such policy will
tend to outstrip the realities of deterrence. There may be strong
tendencies to move the control process beyond its practical application to armed conflict. The security thus afforded becomes illusory if not hazardous, particularly where such "policy" begins
with restraints on the preparations for defense and security, such
as budgetary limitations and withdrawal of military forces in the
belief that nondeployment zones are moving constructively ahead.
Pressures to move unilaterally are evident in the attempts to
"control" the use of riot control gases. It is thought that these
5s One of the difficulties with the arms control agreements is that they provide expressly for termination of "denunciation." When a State is confronted
with sticking with the agreement or denouncing it, with no middle ground, the

denunciation, as in the case of Japan's denunciation of the Washington Naval

Treaty, effective Dec. 31, 1936 may be the start of a major arms race. See
R. WEIGLEY, supra note 6, at 247.
58Helsinki Accords, 62 DEP'T STATE BULL. 323-350, No. 1888 (Sept. 1,
1975), which reads, in part: "The participating States recognize the interest of
all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting
disarmament which are designed to complement political detente in Europe
and to strengthen their security. They are convinced of the necessity to take
effective measures in these fields which by their scope and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and which should result in
strengthening peace and security throughout the world." The Helsinki Accords
are in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1292 (1975).
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gases should not be used by a belligerent in combat because they
would give the appearance of lethal gases, and encourage an adversary to engage in retaliatory "gas warfare."
The policies of deterrence are not identical to the shared policies which regulate armed Gonflict itself. Although they apply in
part to armed conflict, they apply to other conduct of States as
well. Deterrence dominated the policy currently shared concernDeterrence
ing nuclear and other mass destruction weapons.
their debecause
here assumes that the weapons cannot be used
structive capabilities would create a conflict whose conduct could
not be guided by prior practice. Nuclear and mass destruction
weapons if unleashed in combat would necessarily establish a
new practice and therefore a new set of attitudes as to the operation of military necessity. The legal elements of reasonableness
which confine the belligerents to discrimating weapons, to forbearance from attacking the civilian population, and to restriction of the targets to be attacked, plus the standard of proportionality, would be put in question if mass destruction and nuclear
weapons were used. The humanitarian elements which the law of
war presently incorporates would be thrust aside.
As we move toward these ultimate weapons of destruction, we
are compelled to move toward ultimate policies which would effectively deny the use of such weapons. But as the previous
analysis indicates, the policies must address and lead to the elimination of the weapons themselves. 5 9 Rather than rely upon illusory demands of "non-use" or "no first use," or the illusory
claim that a State which enters into such an "arms control obligation" is effectively restrained by its "solemn" promise, made in
"good faith," or on the operation of "binding" promises inherent
in pacta sunt servanda.
60

THE POLICIES OF AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE

More effective management of the process of coercion
might
best occupy the attention of policy and decisionmakers during
times in which armed conflict is not, underway. But the realities
59Willot, Political Strategy and Armaments Control in NATO REV. (Aug. 1976),
declares in a valuable analysis: "The most important consequence of the discussions on general and complete disarmament at least for the time being, has
undoubtedly been to convince the two superpowers, and a certain number of
other States, that there could only be full nuclear disarmament within. the
framework, and as a conclusion, to full and general disarmament."
60On aggression and self-defense, see generally 5 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965).
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of the adversary process among the major powers reveal that confrontations among them are also part of their differing and opposing claims to control the decisions in world affairs. Such a competition, if prolonged and intensified, provides a destabilizing
force to deterrence and to any attempt to pursue at the least a
minimum world public order. The choices in this pursuit lie with
the States themselves.
As Professor McDougal has succinctly
pointed out:
Complete disorder, failure to forbid even the most intense and comprehensive destruction of values, is not only possible but has in fact long characterized the perspectives of traditional international law. If, on the other hand, the deliberate choice is made to pursue at least a minimum of order in the
world arena, the coercion that is to be prohibited clearly must be
distinguished from that which is to be permitted. The conceptions both of impermissible and of permissible coercion are
thus necessary in the theoretical formulation of authoritative
policy as well as in the practical application of that policy to
61
interacting human groups.
Unquestionably the very deep differences in the ideologies of
East and West encourage confrontations that fall short of war,
particularly where, taken in the widest perspective, States such as
the Soviet Union seemingly have committed themselves to the
pursuit of domination of the world order. The Soviet Union has
portrayed the Western States as inevitable sources of future
world conflict. In conjunction, the Soviets have utilized "wars of
national liberation" as policy instruments aimed at the West.
The East has claimed the exclusive right to engage in such "just
wars" and has labeled reciprocal Western actions "illegitimate.962 This policy posture has led to further claims that the
freedom fighters in wars of national liberation thus defined are
entitled to preferential treatment both as to capture and as to the
weapons used against them.
Whether preparation for armed conflict is for a State's national
security and self-defense or for aggression, becomes a major question in the ideological dimensions of coercion. One side's preparation for conflict can be viewed as an act of aggression or
threat of aggression by 'the other side. The very concepts of
M. McDOUGAL AND F. FELICIANO, supra note 7, at 128-129.
62 On the views of the USSR on self-determination and
61

the "wars of na-
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self-defense and aggression lose their meaning in the adversary
process, and the ambiguities engendered maintain and support
the tensions between adversaries.
Even the exercise of the
United Nations General Assembly, leading to a "definition" of
aggression, served only to preserve the troublesome ambiguities
which produce confrontations.63
Concurrent with these developments, there have been reinforcing doctrines such as the Brezhnev Declaration at the height
of the Czechoslovakian crisis, establishing a special international
right of intervention in order to protect and promote the "socialist
commonwealth of States."64
The dangers and grave risks associated with the latest developments in weapons and weapon systems suggest that an armed
strike commencing an "armed attack" could occur with little
warning. To the extent that States have a right of self-defense
under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, that right has been
affected and shifted by modern weapons technology - now a major policy factor. Self-defense, in view of these developments,
becomes an extremely complex question of policy and States will
feel an increasing need to claim the right of self-defense as security is destabilized by weapon proliferation.
The claims of States with respect to weapons find considerable prominence in the debates and resolutions of the United Nations. Numerous resolutions are pressed relating to the cessation
of nuclear weapons tests, the renunciation of the use of force, prohibitions addressing the first use of nuclear weapons, and termination of military research. As long as the major States confront
one another, those resolutions suggest that certain asymmetries
65
between "open" and "closed" societies are being addressed.
63 Definition of Aggression, 29 U.N.G.A. Res. 3314, adopted without vote,
Dec. 14, 1974. The fundamental question of aggression appears to revolve
around "intent," which is approached, tentatively, in Article 2, declaring the
first use of armed force by a State "in contravention of the Charter" shall
constitute prima facie evidence of aggression, in the absence -of justifying circumstances. The ambiguities in this provision are such that even acts "in contravention of the Charter" may be justifiable.
64 On the Brezhnev "doctrine," see Legality of Czechoslovak Invasion Question in U.N. Special Committee on Principles of International law, DEP'T
Article 1 of the Soviet-Czechoslovak
STATE BULL. 396-401 (Oct. 14, 1968).
Treaty .on Stationing of Soviet Troops, in force, Oct. 18, 1968, justifies Soviet
troops in Czechoslovakia "for the purposes of ensuring the security of the countries of the socialist commonwealth against the increasing revanchist aspirations
of the West German militarist forces.". Article 2 declares that their "temporary
presence" does not violate the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia.
65 "Open societies" such as the United States draw in greater participaCf. , for example, S. Res.
tion in decisions with respect to the armed forces

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 9: 175

Moreover, the continuous attention to such resolutions tends to
shift the attention of governments from the real business of general and complete disarmament and the creation of substantial
international controls required to afford the equal security upon
which all parties insist.
The impact of these new conditions upon the traditional international law has been primarily to separate the law of "war"
into a jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Extreme proponents of the
Communist version of the "just war" principle therefore declare
that a State found to be an "aggressor" under the criteria of the
",just wars principle is not entitled to the protections and rights
afforded by the law of war. Accordingly, the policies that underlie these forms of confrontations lead first to the replacement of
the notions of aggression with new notions characterized under
the "just war" doctrine. These are then thrust into the law of
war, displacing the humanitarian policies and protections which
66
the law of war now encompasses.
For these reasons, the policies relating to aggression and selfdefense need continuous clarification, particularly as they apply
to the overall process of coercion. Firm principles firmly adhered to serve the interests of security of the United States.
When secure, the United States is better equipped to maintain
international security. 67 As Secretary Kissinger pointed out:
Those ages which in retrospect seem most peaceful were least
in search of peace. Those whose quest for it seems unending
appear least able to achieve tranquility. Whenever peace 2956, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), passed over President Nixon's veto on Nov.
7, 1973.
66 1 share the view with those who argue and are persuaded that the United
Nations Charter contemplates that the world order, and its security, call for both
the system of effective restraints upon the use of force and for a social system
upon which order rests "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights
and for fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex, language,
or religion." See generally Articles 1, 55 and 56 and the Preamble of the Charte r.
67 A deeper analysis into Soviet military doctrine and strategy is not within
the scope of this paper. It is noteworthy, however, that Soviet texts show an
emphasis upon the following: (a) that a future armed conflict with the West is
within the area of reasonable expectations; (b) that preparation for such a conflict must be made so as to minimize the destructive impact on the USSR and
its territory; and (c) that the matter is in any event "political" in nature, which
means that the "humanitarian" element of the law of war must be largely cast
aside, while the armed forces are indoctrinated with an attitude and orientation
of mind and belief that accepts the West as their implacable enemy. See generally the series referred to as SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT, which arc translations
of the fundamental Soviet views by the U.S. Air Force.
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conceived as the avoidance of war - has been the primary objective of a power or a group of powers, the international system
has been at the mercy of the most ruthless member of the international community.
Whenever the international order has
acknowledged that certain principles could not be compromised even for the sake of peace, stability based on an equilib6
rium of forces was at least conccivable. 8
CONCLUSION
A variety of strategies and instruments are available to governments in pursuing their foreign policies. 6 9 These include, in addition to military instruments and policies, economic, ideological
and diplomatic strategies addressing the wider goal of exerting
control over the processes by which the world order arrives at decisions.
The claims and counterclaims which adversary States
or blocs of States are making in their competition for power and in
the process of coercion, extend, in the final analysis, to this goal.
Coercion may now be established through weapons with far
greater destructive force than those previously known to man, and
the decision process in managing a conflict'O using those weapons,
H.

A WORLD RESTORED 1 (1973).
military doctrine, which tends to be "political' in nature, characterizes all non-Communist States as "imperialist," drawing from this that they
are therefore "aggressors." This doctrine holds that a major war with the "iimiperialist" States is "inevitable," unless, of course, the "imperialists" can be
compelled through overwhelming military and economic power to desist their
"imperialistic conduct." See SCOTT, supra note 15, at 81-82, where Krushchev is
quoted on Jan. 6, 1961 in his speech, "For New Victories of the World Communist Movement," as follows: " . . . The U.S. imperialists are bent on bringing the whole world under their sway, and are threatening mankind with nuclear
missile war . . . The facts indicating that the imperialists are pursuing a policy
of outrageous provocations and aggressions are countless . . . Wars arose with
the division of society into classes. This means that the ground for all wars
will not be completely eliminated until society is no longer divided into hostile,
antagonistic classes . . . The imperialists are preparing war chiefly against
the socialist countries, and above all against the Soviet Union, the most powerful of the socialist countries . . ." For development of this theme in countless
writings of Soviet spokesmen, commentators, officials and military commanders, see SCOTT, supra note 15.
68

KISSINGER,

69 Soviet

70 V.

SOKOLOVSKv,

supra note 9, at 278-98, emphasizes civil defense to pro-

tect against the unbalancing thrust of nuclear weapons.
He declares:
The decisive weapons in modern warfare are strategic nuclear weapons, and the
long-range delivery systems for these weapons are located far from the front
line or the border, far beyond the theaters of military operation. Unless one
annihilates or neutralizes these weapons, it is impossible to prevent the destruction of a country's populated centers and it is impossible to count on successfully achieving the aims of the war - even if one destroys the troop units
deployed in the combat theaters. Since the Soviet armed forces have powerful
long-range weapons - strategic nuclear missiles - it is possible to strike directly
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and its outcomes, may be strained beyond the capabilities of governments and their institutions.
Consequently, the competition
among States presently proceeds under an umbrella of mutual
71
deterrence, based on the equal security of the major powers.

If the policies of governments will be to continue treating war
as an instrument of policy," concerns for the future of the world
public order will be raised. But where "war" is read to mean the
use of military strategies, the views of Clausewitz72 remain sig-

nificant

and

bear

repeating 7 3

The question

which remains

open74 is how far, even in limited war, a State can engage in war
"as policy" ' 5 before it loses its control of policy?76 Still, the
policy element remains:
at the enemy's strategic nuclear weapons, his economic base, and his system of
government and military control . . . we should remember that no matter how
effective the system of antiaircraft and antimissle defense, we must have ready
civil-defense forces and weapons for the rapid removal of the results of nuclear
attacks, evacuation of the population from regions subjected to nuclear attack.
. . . In addition, there must be corresponding preparation of the population to
operate under an enemy nuclear attack."
71 The theory of limited war is a theory that even under the nuclear umbrella,
a limited conflict may be pursued, and war retained as an "instrument of policy."
See generally, R. OSGOOD, LIMITED WAR, 13-27 (1957).
72 Clausewitz, as the excerpt indicates, emphasizes the separation of decision
and policy between the political officials and military officers. This view is accepted by the USSR. See L. GouR, WAR SURVIVAL IN SOVIET STRATEGY 23
(1976): "The premise of Marxism-Leninism on war as a continuation of policy
by military means remains true in an atmosphere of fundamental changes in
military matters. The attempt of certain bourgeois ideologists to prove that nuclear missile weapons leave war outside the framework of policy and that nuclear war moves beyond the control of policy, ceases to be an instrument of policy
and does not constitute its continuation is theoretically incorrect and politically
reactionary."
13 Aron, Reason and Power in the Thought of Clausewitz, 39 Soc. REs. 599
(1972).
74 See generally, P. PARET, CLAUSEWITZ AND THE STATE (1976).
75 Although there are limitations upon the use of war its an instrument of
policy - in large measure because the citizens' armies and citizen plrticipatiou
tend to affect its use - there is still little evidence to show that ins State views
its use in any other way. For a study on this subject, see J. SHoi'WELI, WAR AS
AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY (1929).
Unfortunately, the -alternatives to
war" appear in the form of dispute-settling mechanisms, which fail to recognize, as Clausewitz does, that conflict is endemic, and that therefore the decision
process needed is one of conflict regulation.
See R., DAHRENDORF, CLASS AND
CLASS CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 223 (1959).
See also, MILITARY POLICY
AND NATIONAL SECURITY (W. Kaufnian ed. 1956).
-1 According to Griflth, "Sut Tzu's realism and moderation form a contrast
to Claisewitz 's tendency to emphasize the logical ideal and the 'absolute,'
which his disciples caught on to in developing the theory and practical o 'total war'
beyond all bounds of sense."
Supra note 40, at 5. The first ot' Sun TzI'S
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Now, this (political) unity is the conception that War is only a
part of political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in itself.
We know, certainly, that War is only called forth through the
political intercourse of Governments and Nations; but in general
it is supposed that such intercourse is broken off by War, and
that a totally different state of things ensues, subject to no laws
but its own,
We maintain, on the contrary, that War is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means.
We say mixed with other means in order thereby to maintain

at the same time that this political intercourse does not cease
by the War itself, is not changed into something quite different,
but that, in its essence, it continues to exist, whatever may be
the form of the means which it uses, and that the chief lines on
which the events of the War progress, and to which they are
attached, are only the general features of policy which run all
through the War until peace takes place. And how can we
conceive it to be otherwise? Does the cessation of diplomatic
notes stop the political relations between different Nations
and Governments? Is not War merely another kind of writing
and language for political thoughts? It has certainly a grammar of its own, but its logic is not peculiar to itself.
Accordingly, war can never he scparatcd from political intercourse, and if, in the consideration of -,he matter, this is done
in any way, all the threads of the different relations are, to a
certain extent, broken, and we have before us a senseless thing
without an object . ..
• . .we (must) reflect that real war is no .. .consistent effort tending to an extreme, as it should be according to the
abstract idea, but a half and half thing, a contradiction in itself; that, as such, it cannot follow its own laws, but must be
looked upon as part of another whole - and this whole is policy.
• . . If War belongs to policy, it will naturally take itscharacter
from thence. If policy is grand and powerful, so also will be the
War, and this may be carried to the point at which War attains
to its absolute form .. .
. . . the next question is, whether policy is necessarily paramount and everything else subordinate to it.
That policy may take a false direction, and may promote unfairly the ambitious ends, the private interests, the vanity of
rulers, does not concern us here; for, under no circumstances can
the Art of War be regarded as its preceptor, and we can only
"Estinmates"' dcclares: "1. War is a flatter of vital importancc to the State; the
provin ce of life
or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is inandaitorv that it
be thoroughly studied."

Styra note 40, at1.
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look at the policy here as the representative of the interests
generally of the whole community.
The only question, therefore, is whether in framing plans for a
War the political point of view should give way to the purely
military (if such a point is conceivable), that is to say, should
disappear altogether, or subordinate itself to it, or whether the
political is to remain the ruling point of view and the military
to be considered subordinate to it.
That the political point of view should end completely when
War begins is only conceivable in contests which are Wars of
life and death, from pure hatred . . . The subordination of
the political point of view to the military would be contrary to
common sense, for policy has declared the War; it is the intelligent faculty, War only the instrument, and not the reverse.
The subordination of the military point of view to the political,
is therefore the only thing which is possible.
• . . in one word, the Art of War in its highest point of view is
policy, but, no doubt, a policy which fights battles instead of
writing notes.
According to this view, to leave a great military enterprise or to
plan for one, to a purely military judgment and decision is a distinction which cannot be allowed and is even prejudicial. Indeed it
is an irrational proceeding to consult professional soldiers on the
plan of a War, that they may give a purely military opinion upon
what the Cabinet ought to do. But still more absurd is the demand of Theorists that a statement of the available means of
War should be laid before the General, that he may draw out a
purely military plan for the war or for a campaign in accordance
with those means. Experience in general also teaches us that
notwithstanding the multifarious branches and scientific character of military art in the present day, still the leading outlines
of a War are always determined by the Cabinet, that is, if we
would use technical language, by a political not a military organ.
None of the principal plans which are required for a War can
be made without an insight into the political relations; and, in
reality, when people speak, as they often do, of the prejudicial
influence of policy on the conduct of a War, they say in reality
something very different to what they intend. It is not the influence but the policy itself which should be found fault with.
If policy is right, that is, if it succeeds in hitting the object,
then it can only act with advantage on the war. If this influence of policy causes a divergence from the object, the cause is
only to be looked for in a mistaken policy.
• . . Therefore the actual changes in the Art of War are a consequence of alterations in policy; and, so far from being an argument for the possible separation of the two, they are, on the
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contrary,
very strong evidence of the intimacy of the connec77
tion.
In conclusion, an appraisal of the policies of States at the
present time reveals: (a) Strong indications that "war as an instrument of national policy" will continue to guide the actions of
States, notwithstanding the risks of nuclear warfare and the grave
possibility that a variety of mass destruction weapons will be
used. 78 Such actions will be pursued as they were in the past,
but under. more hazardous conditions, either in the context of the
"limited war," or in the context of the use of military instruments
to sustain and effect national policies. Such policies would then
be supported by threat, the potential of surprise, or perhaps actual
attack, giving effectiveness to the other foreign policy instruments
of diplomatic, economic or ideological strategies. This appraisal
also reveals: (b) That the policies of States addressing the jus ad
bellum and jus in bello are beginning to converge, so that States
will be tempted to decide that just as coercion extends over a
continuum, so also do the policies underlying national conduct,
which bear marked similarities over that entire continuum.
This second trend, the extension of State policy over the
entire continuum of coercion, is unfavorable to the establishment
of a world order in at least one major respect. It has conditioned
some States, particularly those in the Communist bloc, not to
favor the protection and promotion of human rights or humanitarian goals. In place of those goals, these States have sought
internal and external security through their policies, in accordance
with the now familiar perspectives of the Brezhnev Doctrine and
with the search for a world-wide "socialist commonwealth of
States."
To the extent that these policies remain in the ascendant and displace the humanitarian elements in the law of war,
we must expect that they will cause increasing destabilization in
a world order, already excessively characterized by destabilizing
elements.
77 3 K. CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 121-130

(J. Graham trans. 1940).
are the policies of nations such as the United States which are
committed to a democratic form of government. When the United States entered into the First World War, it lacked the organizational base to carry on
that war.
See generally, H. DEWEERD, PRESIDENT WILSON FIGHTS His WAR
(1968). The conclusion of the war revealed that the nation was unable to benefit from a war that might be an "instrument of national policy."
Although
President Wilson might have been a "special case," DeWeerd observes:
"Against the advice of his friends and advisors, Wilson stubbornly refused to
compromise with his adversaries in the Senate over reservations to the peace
treaty. In the end he destroyed the fruits of victory, which were won at such
a great cost in lives and suffering." Id. at 252.
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